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I. INTRODUCTION
For a married couple to be divorced under Conservative or Orthodox
Jewish law, the husband must prepare and present to his wife a bill of
divorce or get1 under the supervision of a rabbi.2 The wife may not pro-
cure a divorce on her own.' If the husband leaves his wife without
presenting a get to her, neither party may remarry under Jewish law."
The wife must bear additional disabilities:' Her involvement in Jewish
1. I. HAUT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 17 (1983); I. KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 467 (1979). The requirement originates in Deuteronomy 24:1 (Soncino):
When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in
his eyes, because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that he writeth her a bill of
divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house ....
A get is not required in the Reform tradition. See M. LAMM, THE JEWISH WAY IN LOVE AND
MARRIAGE 48 (1980). Accordingly, this Note addresses the issue of Jewish divorce only as it arises in
the Conservative and Orthodox traditions. Hereinafter, "Jewish law" and "Judaism" are used to
refer to these traditions.
I See I. HAtrr, supra note 1, at 31 (divorce proceeding must be conducted in presence of most
learned authorities). The procedural formalities that attend the preparation and delivery of a get are
routine but complex; therefore they require expert rabbinical supervision. See id. The rabbi, however,
does not grant the divorce; the husband's presentation and the wife's receipt of the get suffice, under
normal circumstances, to effect the divorce. I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 467. For a summary of the
historical development of the formalities attending the presentation of a get, see generally D. AMRAM,
THE JEWISH LAW OF DIVORCE ACCORDING TO BIBLE AND TALMUD 132-204 (1896).
3. I. HAUT, supra note 1, at 18.
4. I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 383. In biblical times Judaism permitted polygamous marriage for
men. Today, Jewish law prohibits polygamy except in a few, limited circumstances. Id. at 388-90.
5. She is relegated to the status of an agunah. "The agunah is a woman whose marriage is in
fact ended or suspended, but who legally remains a married woman . . . unable to remarry." R.
BIALE, WOMEN AND JEWISH LAW 102 (1984). The circumstances in which a wife becomes an
agunah include abandonment by her husband and the death of her husband when there is no valid
testimony regarding his death, id.; the marital status of a woman whose husband has abandoned her
remains in limbo until he grants her a get. I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 450-51. Judaism considers the
fate of the agunah to be tragic. R. BIALE, supra, at 102. In fact, Jewish law has relaxed its tradi-
tional testimonial requirements so that a woman may more easily prove the death of her husband and
remarry. Id. at 104-05. For a powerful depiction of the fate of the agunah, see C. GRADE, THE
AGUNAH (1974).
Any subsequent relations with another man, including relations within a civil marriage, render the
agunah an adulteress under Jewish law. G. HOROwrrz, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 204 (1953).
In biblical times, a wife's adultery was punishable by death. Later, the penalty was flogging and
automatic divorce. Id. at 205. No comparable sanctions were imposed on a man engaging in extra-
marital affairs. Id. at 204 & n.21. While such sanctions are not enforced currently, an adulteress
suffers the outcast status that Jewish law imposes on any child she bears from the tainted union. See
infra note 7 and accompanying text.
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religious life becomes circumscribed. 6 Moreover, any children she bears
from a subsequent sexual union are excluded by Jewish law from partici-
pation in the Jewish community.7 Her husband does not suffer such se-
vere consequences.8
With the availability of civil divorce, many husbands married under
Jewish law have sought and obtained civil divorces without giving their
wives a get.9 For the most part, they have been motivated by spite or by
the desire to obtain a favorable alimony settlement.10 Their wives have
been unable to remarry under Jewish law or have been forced to bargain
away a part of their rightful alimony to obtain a get.
In response to this problem, the New York Legislature enacted Domes-
tic Relations Law section 253,11 commonly referred to as the get statute.
The law requires that a party filing for divorce remove all conscientious
or religious barriers within his or her power to the remarriage of the
other spouse."2 The statute raises anew the question of how far govern-
ment is permitted under the establishment clause13 to facilitate religious
practices central to the identity and continued existence of a religious
community.
1 4
6. An observant Jewish woman fulfills important religious obligations within marriage. See infra
note 117 and accompanying text.
7. See G. HOROWITZ, supra note 5, at 264. Children born of an adulterous woman are
mamzerim and are not permitted to enter the "'congregation of the Lord' "; that is, they are not
permitted to marry Jews who are not mamzerim. d. (quoting Deuteronomy 23:3).
8. Judaism does not condone a man's extramarital affairs or subsequent civil remarriage. Extra-
marital relations are forbidden in the Bible. Deuteronomy 23:18; see 2 M. MAIMONIDES, SEFER-
HAMrrZVOTH 322-23 (C. Chavel trans. 1967) (Negative Commandment 355). A subsequent civil
remarriage might be treated as an extramarital affair or prohibited under the ban against polygamy
that has been in force since the eleventh century. See I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 388-89. Nevertheless,
Jewish law imposes no disabilities on children begotten in such relationships. Children who are the
product of a man's extramarital affair with a single woman are not mamzerim. See G. HOROWITZ,
supra note 5, at 264.
9. Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judidal Misconceptions and Possible Means of Civil Enforcement, 16
CONN. L. REV. 201, 201 (1984).
10. Id. at 202.
11. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1986). No legislative history of the statute is availa-
ble. For a discussion of the background and purpose of the law, see id. § 253 practice commentary at
851-53. At the time the statute was passed, an estimated 15,000 observant Orthodox and Conservative
Jewish women were civilly divorced but had not received gets. Hentoff, Who Will Rescue the Jewish
Women Chained in Limbo?, Village Voice, Sept. 13, 1983, at 6.
Before the get statute's enactment, the New York Court of Appeals had responded to the problem
by enforcing a Jewish marriage agreement, or ketubah, which compelled the parties to appear before
a rabbinic tribunal if marital difficulties arose. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d
136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983). For further discussion of Avitzur, see
infra note 132. An alternative solution to the get problem, based on liability for intentional infliction
of emotional harm, has been suggested. See Note, Jewish Divorce: What Can Be Done in Secular
Courts To Aid the Jewish Woman?, 19 GA. L. REv. 389 (1985).
12. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(2)-(6). See infra note 123 for the relevant text of the statute.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. The Supreme Court has confronted the issue regularly in the cases involving aid to parochial
schools. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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While no court has yet ruled on the question,"5 several commentators
have expressed grave reservations about the constitutionality of the get
statute.1 6 They argue that the statute violates the establishment clause by
casting government into questions properly within the purview of religion,
giving religious functionaries control over civil affairs, and using civil
courts to advance religion. In contrast, one commentator suggests that such
a statute's accommodation of a Jewish woman's right to remarry within
Judaism might be sufficient to justify it as a permissible accommodation
of religion under the establishment clause.1
Divergent analyses of the get statute's constitutionality under the estab-
lishment clause are not surprising, given the absence of a generally ac-
cepted approach that unifies free exercise and establishment jurispru-
dence. In their present states, neither establishment nor free exercise
doctrine alone provides a basis to decide the constitutionality of the get
statute, which raises both establishment and free exercise concerns. The
Supreme Court has recognized a zone of accommodations of religion that
are permitted by the establishment clause, though not required by the free
exercise clause, 8 but it has failed to articulate the relationship between
the two clauses and thus to demarcate clearly this zone. 9
15. The only decision addressing the constitutionality of the get statute is Chambers v. Chambers,
122 Misc. 2d 671, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. 1983). Chambers struck down § 253(4), which re-
quired affidavits by both parties in uncontested proceedings, as an unconstitutional impairment of
contracts.
16. See, e.g., Warmflash, The New York Approach to Enforcing Religious Marriage Contracts:
From Avitzur to the Get Statute, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 229, 252 (1984) (get statute impermissibly
advances religion); Note, Avitzur v. Avitzur and New York Domestic Relations Law Section 253:
Civil Response to a Religious Dilemma, 49 ALB. L. REV. 131, 167-68 (1984) (same); Note, Jewish
Divorce and Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur, 73 GEo. L.J. 193, 206-07 (1984) (same);
Comment, The Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in Marital and Consti-
tutional Separations, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 204, 212-56 (1985) (get statute violates free exercise and
establishment clauses); Kochen, Constitutional Implications of New York's "Get" Statute, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (get statute violates establishment clause because it lacks secular purpose,
impermissibly advances religion, and entangles government in religious affairs).
17. Bleich, supra note 9, at 277-86. Professor Bleich discusses a precursor of § 253, amendment
A. 7980, enacted during the 1981-1982 legislative session but subsequently withdrawn from the gov-
ernor's desk by its sponsor. Id. at 285. According to Professor Bleich, this amendment sought to codify
divorce courts' traditional equity power to withhold divorces in situations in which granting a divorce
would lead to an inequitable result, such as a party's inability to remarry within his or her religion.
Id. at 286. Professor Bleich avoids taking a position on § 253, which, he suggests, may present more
serious constitutional problems. Id. at 286-87 n.265.
18. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding against establishment challenge program
that released children from school premises for religious education and devotional exercises).
19. Although the Court in Zorach recognized that the contested time-release program implicated
free exercise concerns, it failed to address the tension between the free exercise and establishment
clauses. See id. at 313-14. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court stated, "[t]he
limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninter-
ference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 673. It noted that exempting churches from
property taxes relieved burdens on religious exercise, but failed to explain how this observation in-
formed its determination of nonestablishment. See id. Most recently, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985), Justice O'Connor pointed out the inadequacies of traditional establishment analysis in
situations where legislation furthers free exercise by removing government-imposed burdens on reli-
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This Note proposes an approach to determining the permissibility of
governmental accommodations of religion based on the norms embodied in
both religion clauses. It defines an accommodation of religion as legisla-
tion that functions to remove governmentally imposed burdens on religious
exercise. The Note next argues that establishment challenges to accommo-
dations of religion should be evaluated under a different standard from
that applied to legislation that does not meet the definition of accommoda-
tion. It then formulates a standard for the permissibility of a government
accommodation of religion under the establishment clause that incorpo-
rates the legislation's status as an accommodation. Finally, the Note ap-
gious exercise. See id. at 82-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Numerous commentators have sought to reconcile the nonestablishment mandate and the free exer-
cise guarantee. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 675 (1980) (establishment clause forbids "only government action
whose purpose is solely religious and that is likely to impair religious freedom by coercing, compro-
mising, or influencing religious beliefs") (emphasis omitted); Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961) (religion clauses prohibit "classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden" on religious exercise); Moore, The Supreme
Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L.
REV. 142, 196-97 (1963) (laws either having sufficient secular purpose or protecting free exercise do
not violate establishment clause); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause
Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 693 (1968) (accommodations of religion do not violate establishment clause
unless their purpose or effect is imposition of religious belief or practice).
For a recent attempt to argue that accommodations of religious exercise are permissible under the
establishment clause, see McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1. Professor
McConnell does not distinguish between governmentally imposed and privately imposed burdens on
religious exercise. Id. at 31-32. Consequently, his claim that government should be permitted to re-
move both types of burdens goes much further than this Note's argument that government may re-
move governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise. See infra text accompanying notes 32-67.
McConnell argues that permissible accommodations should encompass removal of private burdens on
religious exercise by analogy to other areas, such as equal protection, in which government has com-
pelled private individuals to conform to constitutional norms. McConnell, supra, at 32. McConnell
overlooks the core nonestablishment principle that government may not require private individuals to
bear the costs of facilitating the religious exercise of others. This principle is captured in Madison's
famous rhetorical question in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments:
"[Who does not see t]hat the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other estab-
lishment in all cases whatsoever?" 2 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 183, 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), reprinted
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65-66 app. (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also infra
notes 98-104 (government may not subsidize religious activities).
Where the free exercise clause requires government to accommodate religious exercise, the free
exercise mandate has, sub silentio, overridden establishment concerns. In such cases the Court has
done no more than gesture towards the establishment clause. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S.
205, 220-21 (1972) (establishment clause concerns do not justify withholding exemption required by
free exercise clause); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627-29 (1978) (Tennessee disqualifi-
cation of cleric from service as delegate in election based on nonestablishment rationale violates cleric's
free exercise of religion); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-7, at 833-34 (1978)
(free exercise principle dominant in cases of conflict). While the Court's nod toward the establishment
clause may suffice in cases involving an exemption, such as Yoder, or nondiscrimination, such as
McDaniel, it is inadequate in cases in which government takes affirmative steps to accommodate free
exercise, as in the case of the military chaplaincy. See, e.g., Note, Military Mirrors on the Wall:
Nonestablishment and the Military Chaplaincy, 95 YALE L.J. 1210, 1227-32 (1986) (military chap-
laincy violates the establishment clause by excessively entangling government in religion and favoring
ecumenical Protestantism over other religions).
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plies this standard to the get statute and concludes that it is a permissible
accommodation of religion.
II. GOVERNMENT ACCOMMODATIONS OF RELIGION
A. The Tension Between the Free Exercise Guarantee and the
Nonestablishment Mandate
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
.... )20 Together, the religion clauses create a division between a private
sphere, within which the free exercise clause protects individual exercise
of religion, and a public governmental sphere, from which the establish-
ment clause excludes religion.21 The religion clauses envision a secular
government under which a plurality of religious ways of life are free to
flourish. 22 In Zorach v. Clauson, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
emphasized: "We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that
shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according
to the zeal of its adherents and appeal of its dogma."23
Despite the unified purpose underlying the religion clauses, either
clause, "if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other."'24 Through excessive solicitude for religious exercise, government
may run afoul of the establishment clause. 25 Conversely, too stringent ap-
plication of the nonestablishment mandate may violate the free exercise
guarantee.26 The expansion of the welfare state since World War II and
the consequent blurring of the line between the governmental and private
spheres have caused this conceptual tension, which is inherent in the reli-
gion clauses, to emerge acutely.27
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The free exercise and establishment clauses apply to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
21. "The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family
and the institutions of private choice . . . ." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971); see L.
TRIBE, supra note 19, § 14-3, at 818 (identifying voluntarism and separatism as principles underly-
ing Court's interpretation of religion clauses).
22. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
23. Id. at 313.
24. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating moment of silence statute).
26. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (free exercise clause prohibits Tennessee
from barring cleric from serving as state constitutional delegate notwithstanding state's nonestablish-
ment rationale).
27. See Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1243 & n.33
(1986) ("seemingly crisp dichotomies" of Lemon test inadequate to deal with complexities of church-
state relations since New Deal). Many of the cases decided under the religion clauses prior to Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), involved the regulation of proselytising, see, e.g., Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (distribution of religious literature); consequently, they often im-
plicated free speech considerations. In the last 40 years, litigation based on the religion clauses has
proliferated, much of it concerning general welfare legislation. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
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Professor Kurland has argued that the tension between the two clauses
must be resolved in favor of strict neutrality: Government may not use
any religious classifications either to confer a benefit or to impose a bur-
den on religion.28 An implication of his view is that the free exercise
clause does not justify granting religious exemptions from otherwise valid
legislation.2
Other commentators have argued that Professor Kurland ignores the
preferred position that the Constitution confers on religious exercise
through the free exercise clause.30 The Supreme Court has never espoused
a strictly neutral interpretation of the clauses; rather, it has regularly con-
strued the free exercise clause to exempt religious exercise from burden-
some legislation even though such exemptions in some sense benefit reli-
gion.31 The approach reflected in exemption doctrine can be characterized
as benign neutrality. In situations where government must choose between
infringing upon or facilitating religious exercise, the free exercise clause
requires that, absent an overriding governmental interest, government
choose the latter course.
398 (1963) (exempting under free exercise clause Sabbatarian from legislation conditioning receipt of
unemployment compensation benefits on willingness to work on sabbath); Everson, 330 U.S. I (up-
holding under establishment clause state transportation of children to parochial schools); and, more
recently, Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986) (state's use of child's Social Security number permit-
ted under free exercise clause even though such use violates parents' religious beliefs); Aguilar v.
Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (striking down remedial aid program for parochial school students).
In many cases, the Court has been aware of the tension. See, e.g., Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313; Ever-
son, 330 U.S. at 16. As one commentator has observed, most establishment problems can be cast in
free exercise terms and vice versa. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 821-25 (1984).
28. Kurland, supra note 19, at 6.
29. Choper, supra note 19, at 688-89; see also Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 16-17 (1978)
(Supreme Court has failed to reconcile exemption doctrine with nonestablishment mandate).
30. See Choper, supra note 19, at 688-89; see also Moore, supra note 19, at 196 (religion
clauses' purpose to maximize religious freedom justifies exemptions).
31. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The decision allowed Mrs. Sherbert to
refuse jobs that required Saturday work without losing unemployment benefits. In contrast, persons
who might have nonreligious reasons for preferring not to work on Saturdays had to be willing to
accept Saturday work. Id. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 247 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe logical interrelationship between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses may produce situations where an injunction against an
apparent establishment must be withheld in order to avoid infringement of rights of free exercise.").
Justice Stevens, however, disapproves of exemptions under the free exercise clause because of their
potential for violating the establishment clause. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1316
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (opposing exemption from Air Force regulations for yarmulke wearer
as engendering religious favoritism); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (establishment clause seeks to avoid risk that exemption will be perceived as favoring one
religion over another).
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B. Direct and Indirect Burdens on Religious Exercise:
Braunfeld v. Brown Revisited
With the vast expansion of governmental regulation of health, safety,
welfare, and morals the state necessarily impinges on religious belief and
practice. Compulsory vaccination requirements, for example, violate some
religious beliefs.3 2 Requiring parochial school instructors to meet teacher
certification requirements increases the costs of religious education. Dis-
tinguishing which of these infringements of religious freedom must give
way to the constitutional guarantee of free exercise, from those which
need not, has been a central challenge of the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,3 3 the Court resolved this difficult task by dis-
tinguishing direct from indirect burdens on religious exercise. 4 Although
the Court has not relied on the distinction in subsequent free exercise
cases,35 it provides an analytic framework to separate occasions when gov-
ernment may be required to accommodate an adherent's religious exercise
from those when government is not required but may be permitted to ac-
commodate religious exercise.36
32. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
33. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
34. Id. at 606-07.
35. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). On the Court's later reading of
Braunfeld, government must accommodate religious exercise significantly burdened either directly or
indirectly by government action, absent an overriding governmental interest in enforcing the legisla-
tion. See id. at 403, 408-09; Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981). In Sherbert, the
Court characterized the Braunfeld holding as a refusal to extend mandated free exercise protection to
the indirect burden on religious exercise caused by a Sunday Closing Law, on the ground that the
state had established a strong interest in a uniform day of rest. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408. This Note,
in contrast, argues that Sherbert and its progeny expanded the meaning of direct burdens on religious
exercise. See infra text accompanying notes 41-43. While the indirect/direct distinction may appear
merely semantic, it has significant ramifications for free exercise analysis. Under the Court's construc-
tion, the distinction between indirect and direct burdens carries no analytic import; the test applied to
either type of burden is whether a compelling state interest exists that outweighs the burdened free
exercise interest. If not, the religious interest must be accommodated. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
403.
Although the Court did not rely on the direct/indirect distinction, last term, in Bowen v. Roy, 106
S. Ct. 2147 (1986), it held that certain free exercise claims were not cognizable under the free exercise
clause. The plaintiff in Bowen argued that the government's use of a Social Security number for his
daughter infringed his free exercise of religion, because he believed that such use would impair his
daughter's spirit. Id. at 2152. The Court held that his claim did not fall within the protection of the
free exercise clause. Id. Under this Note's analysis, in contrast, the government's use of the number
indirectly burdens the plaintiff's religious beliefs; consequently, the government is not required, but
may be permitted, to accommodate the belief. See infra text accompanying notes 45-53. For further
discussion of Bowen, see infra note 58.
Several lower courts have recently revived the line drawn in Braunfeld to distinguish free exercise
claims that require accommodation from those that do not. See, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305-06 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 815 (1983); Congregation Beth Yitzchok, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655, 659
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
36. The usefulness of the distinction was pointed out to me by Professor Perry Dane. It is implicit
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A law imposes a direct burden on an adherent's religious exercise if, as
applied to the adherent, its operation turns on the adherent's disavowal of
a religious belief or abandonment of a religious practice. Thus, legislation
imposes a direct burden when it requires a religious adherent to engage in
actions forbidden by his or her faith,"7 or prohibits actions required by his
or her faith. 8 For example, application of a narcotics law to native Amer-
icans who subscribe to Peyotism constitutes a direct burden on their reli-
gious exercise.39 The law's prohibition of the use of peyote conflicts with
the religious dictates prescribing its use. 0
In addition, legislation that conditions the receipt of generally available
benefits upon the disavowal of religious beliefs or abandonment of reli-
gious practices directly burdens religious exercise. For example, legislation
that conditions the availability of unemployment benefits on an applicant's
willingness to work on Saturdays imposes a direct burden on the religious
exercise of Sabbatarians. 41 Like the application of the narcotics law to
adherents of Peyotism, the application of the unemployment benefit re-
quirements to Sabbatarians turns on their renouncing their religious
faith .4  Legislation thus imposes a direct burden on religious exercise
through its formal interaction with the dictates of religion. When legisla-
tion directly burdens an adherent's religious exercise, the free exercise
clause requires government to exempt the adherent from the legislation,
unless a compelling governmental interest overrides the adherent's free ex-
ercise interest.48
Legislation imposes an indirect burden on religious exercise when it
contributes to the economic or social costs of religious adherence. The
Sunday Closing Law at issue in Braunfeld exemplifies such legislation.
Braunfeld and the other appellants, Orthodox Jewish merchants, sought
an exemption from a Sunday Closing Law." They argued that the law
in the characterization of an exemption claim as a claim based on a conflict between the demands of
religious faith and civil legal requirements. See Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise
Clause: A Model for Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980) (proposing conflicts of law
model to resolve exemption claims).
37. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (exempting Amish from educational
requirements that conflicted with their religious beliefs).
38. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 720-22, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74.
41. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Sabbatarian exempt from statute conditioning
unemployment benefits on willingness to work on Saturdays); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (Jehovah's Witness cannot be denied unemployment benefits based on termination for "good
cause" when job terminated for refusal, on religious grounds, to engage in weapons production).
42. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
43. Cf. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. But see Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct.
2147, 2154-58 (1986) (plurality decision) (emphasizing difference between statutes penalizing reli-
gious beliefs and those conditioning benefits on disavowal of religious beliefs; applying lower standard
to latter).
44. Sunday Closing Laws were upheld under the establishment clause in a companion case, Mc-
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burdened the free exercise of their religion, which required them to re-
frain from work on Saturdays.4 5 The Sunday Closing Law put them at a
severe economic disadvantage in relation to merchants who could conduct
business six days a week, in effect compelling them to choose between
adherence to their faith and economic survival.46 The law did not impose
a requirement that formally contradicted the dictates of Judaism; rather,
it was a factor that contributed to the cost of the appellants' religious
adherence.47 But for the competitive nature of the retail business, the leg-
islation would not have had any consequences for their religious exercise.
Because the burden was caused by the interaction of the statute and the
prevailing economic conditions, it could be described as incidental to the
legislation. Such a characterization, however, should not detract from ap-
preciation of the severity of the cost involved: Braunfeld alleged that the
Sunday Closing Law would force him to go out of business.4
The Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause did not require
Pennsylvania to exempt the Braunfeld appellants from the Sunday Clos-
ing Law.49 The Court, however, did not appeal to establishment clause
limitations on the free exercise guarantee that rendered such an exemption
invalid; 50 rather, it strongly suggested that Pennsylvania would have been
permitted to incorporate an exemption for Sabbatarians into the statute,
had it so chosen.51 Noting that a number of states provide such exemp-
tions, it suggested that an exemption might be a "wiser solution to the
problem.1 52 The Court also identified countervailing factors, such as en-
forcement and entanglement problems, that might prompt a legislature to
withhold an exemption.53 The Court thus viewed the propriety of an ex-
emption as a question best left to the discretion of the legislature.
The Sunday Closing Law at issue in Braunfeld resulted in an eco-
nomic cost to the plaintiffs' religious exercise. Zoning ordinances 4 and the
taxation of religious institutions55 may also impose financial burdens on
religious exercise. Indirect burdens on religious exercise are not, however,
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
45. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961).
46. Id. at 601-02.
47. The appellants' stated that the Sunday Closing Law would impair their ability to earn a
livelihood. Id. at 601.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 608-09.
50. id.
51. Id. at 608.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 608-09.
54. See, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303, 307-08 (6th Cir.) (free exercise clause does not require exemption from zoning ordi-
nance that increased cost of acquiring land zoned to permit church construction), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 815 (1983).
55. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
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limited to economic effects. A statute requiring the slaughter of animals by
certain prescribed methods could effectively rule out the consumption of
meat by persons whose religion dictated alternative methods. Although the
statute would not compel such persons to eat meat, it would force them to
choose between consuming meat and observing their faith.
5
1
Finally, government's actions may impose an indirect burden on an ad-
herent's beliefs. For example, commercial development of government-
owned land containing Native American sacred religious sites places an
indirect burden on the religious beliefs of adherents of religions that hold
these sites sacred.5 7 Similarly, the government's use of social security
numbers may burden a Native American's belief that such use impairs his
or her spirit."
Braunfeld's delimitation of mandated government accommodations to
legislation directly burdening religious exercise did not derive strictly from
either the nonestablishment mandate or from the free exercise guarantee.59
Rather, the distinction between direct and indirect burdens corresponds
broadly to practical limitations 0 on courts' capacity to manage full en-
56. In recognition of Jewish and other religious dietary restrictions, the Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act exempts ritual slaughter. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1906 (1982). The Act was upheld against
establishment challenge in Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 419 U.S. 806 (1974).
57. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 742 (D.C. Cir.) (commercial development of Hopi and
Navajo sacred sites, which is "inconsistent with the plaintiffs' beliefs, and will cause the plaintiffs
spiritual disquiet," nevertheless not enjoined by free exercise clause), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983). But see Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 585-86 (9th
Cir. 1985) (free exercise protection encompasses indirect burdens on site-specific religions created by
development of land). Such development does not usually involve governmental denial of access to
sacred sites for participation in rituals required by the religion. See, e.g., Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
Development that imposed such an exclusion would directly burden the religious exercise of those
adherents who held those sites sacred.
To characterize the development of federal lands containing sacred sites as imposing an indirect
burden is not to belittle the development's devastating potential. It may result in the destruction of
site-specific religions. See Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public
Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1447 (1985). The history of governmental appropriation of land inhab-
ited by Native Americans may present a special case for full judicial enforcement of the free exercise
guarantee. Even if it did not, this Note argues that the norm embodied in the free exercise clause
compels legislatures to accommodate site-specific religions, despite the inability of courts to require
such actions. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
58. See Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2151-53 (1986). Mr. Roy, the plaintiff, had asserted two
separate free exercise claims: He argued that the government could not condition Social Security
benefits upon the acquisition of a Social Security number for his daughter, because such acquisition
violated his religious beliefs, and that the government, having assigned a Social Security number to his
daughter, could not use it for internal purposes, because he believed this use would rob her spirit. Id.
at 2151. With regard to the first claim, the plurality adopted a variation of the traditional test, evalu-
ating the governmental interest in requiring that applicants acquire Social Security numbers. See id.
at 2156-58 (plurality opinion). The Court did not find the second claim cognizable under the free
exercise clause. "The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the [glovernment
to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citi-
zens." Id. at 2152.
59. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608-09.
60. "The list of legislation [having an indirect burden on religious exercise] is nearly limitless."
Id. at 606. Courts would be deluged with claims for exemptions from legislation indirectly burdening
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forcement of the free exercise norm.6 1 Legislative processes, which can
accommodate competing needs of constituents by using flexibility and ex-
perimentation, are better suited to determine when and by what means
indirect burdens should be alleviated. By removing indirect burdens on
religious exercise, a legislature furthers the norm embodied in the free
exercise clause.
6 2
The free exercise clause's prohibition against governmental interference
justifies voluntary legislative attempts to facilitate religious exercise by
removing indirect governmentally imposed burdens.6 3 When government
removes such burdens it is accommodating, rather than promoting, reli-
gion: When a statutory scheme contributes to the economic, social, or per-
sonal costs of religious exercise or belief, an accommodation alleviates such
effects.64
Governmental accommodations of religion include statutory exemptions,
such as Sunday Closing Law exemptions6 5 and taxation exemptions,66 as
religious exercise, for example taxation, id., and would be faced with the difficult task of evaluating in
each case a series of factors whose assessment is best left to legislatures. It is an unfortunate develop-
ment of free exercise doctrine that courts already engage in a balancing exercise when direct burdens
on religious exercise are at issue. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 327, 330-44 (1969) (criticizing ad hoc nature of compelling state interest test).
61. I use the word "norm" instead of "value" to convey a conception of the free exercise clause as
a constraint on government action. Free exercise values, in contrast, can encompass the actions of
private individuals. Thus, Title VII's requirement that employers reasonably accommodate the reli-
gious practices of their employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982), furthers free exercise values, but does
not implicate the norm embodied in the free exercise clause. See infra note 64.
62. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978). Professor Sager observes that courts regularly decline to uphold consti-
tutionally based norms on the basis of institutional concerns. Id. at 1218-20. He argues:
[Clonstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood
to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short
of these limits should be understood as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts'
role in enforcing the norm: By 'legally valid,' I mean that the unenforced margins of under-
enforced norms should have the full status of positive law which we generally accord to the
norms of our Constitution, save only that the federal judiciary will not enforce these margins.
Id. at 1221.
63. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
64. See id. According to the analysis offered in this Note, Title VII's requirement that employers
reasonably accommodate the religious practices of their employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982), is not
a governmental accommodation of religion because it does not remove governmentally imposed bur-
dens on religious exercise. The provision thus cannot be justified on the ground that it constitutes
legislative enforcement of the norm embodied in the free exercise clause, because that norm is limited
to government action. See Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(Title VII "not the sort of accommodation statute specifically contemplated by the Free Exercise
Clause").
65. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.160(2) (Baldwin 1985) (exempting Sabbatarians from Sun-
day Closing Law), upheld, Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dep't Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky.), appeal
dismissed for want of substantial federal question sub nom. Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371
U.S. 218 (1962). Without discussing the establishment clause in any detail, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals upheld the exemption on the ground that in Braunfeld, the Supreme Court had "by implica-
tion" upheld Sunday Closing Law exemptions. 357 S.W.2d at 710.
66. E.g., N.Y. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1 (exempting property used for religious, educational, or char-
itable purposes), upheld, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court considered the
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well as affirmative attempts to facilitate religious exercise, such as aid to
parochial schools.17 In all of these instances, the touchstone of an accom-
modation of religion is government's attempt to eliminate burdens imposed
on individuals' free exercise of religion by government's own action."8
III. ACCOMMODATIONS OF RELIGION UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
That legislation accommodates religion, however, is not sufficient to es-
tablish its permissibility under the establishment clause."9 While the
nonestablishment mandate does not necessarily require invalidation of
governmental accommodations of religion as such, it places constraints on
the means by which a particular attempt to remove governmentally im-
posed burdens on religion may be carried out. 0
A. Permissibility of Government's Attempts to Accommodate
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,71 the Supreme Court construed the nonestab-
lishment mandate to require that a law (1) have a secular purpose; (2)
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3)
not lead to excessive governmental entanglement with religion.7 2 Literal
application of the secular purpose and neutral primary effect prongs of
the Lemon test would clearly invalidate any accommodation of religion,
secular purpose of the exemption, the lengthy history of church tax exemptions, and the potential for
greater entanglement in taxing churches in its determination of the exemption's constitutionality. See
id. at 672-80.
67. E.g., 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 507, as amended by ch. 508 (1974) (reimbursing parochial schools
for costs of state-mandated exams), reproduced in N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 3601 historical note (McKin-
ney 1981), upheld, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
68. The governmentally sponsored creche upheld in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), was
not the result of an attempt to remove governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise; conse-
quently, it does not constitute an accommodation of religion under the definition advanced in this
Note. The creche may be justifiable by an "acknowledgment" exception to the nonestablishment man-
date. See id. at 676-77 (listing illustrations of "[g]overnment's acknowledgment of our religious
heritage").
69. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[J]udicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would
completely vitiate the Establishment Clause.").
70. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76.
71. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
72. Id. at 612-13. Under the "secular purpose" requirement, the Court has invalidated legislation
providing for the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Under the "primary effect" prong, the Court has struck down maintenance and repair grants to
parochial schools. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-80
(1973).
The Court has relied on Lemon's third prong, the prohibition against excessive governmental en-
tanglement with religion, to invalidate a Massachusetts statute that authorized a church to block
operating licenses for liquor stores located within 500 feet of the church. Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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because every accommodation, qua accommodation, has a religious pur-
pose and a primary effect that advances religion."
Such a mechanical application of Lemon, however, disregards the pro-
tected status that the free exercise clause bestows on religious exercise.7
In this interpretation of the Lemon requirements, the free exercise clause
itself lacks a secular purpose and has the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion.75 Therefore, to determine whether an accommodation violates the
establishment clause it is necessary to focus on the means through which a
particular accommodation is effected rather than on the accommodation
per se.
76
B. Assessing the Permissibility of a Particular Accommodation of
Religion: Lemon Reconsidered
The Lemon test has attracted sharp criticism both inside77 and outside78
the Court. The criticisms focus mainly on the ad hoc results to which the
test gives rise79 and on the test's tendency to obscure the privileged status
that the religion clauses accord religious liberty.80 Despite these criticisms,
Justice O'Connor, who is committed to the continued viability of Lemon,
has revised the first two prongs to proscribe legislation having the purpose
or primary effect of endorsing religion. 81 Justice O'Connor's insight sug-
gests a reformulation of the Lemon standard to provide an approach to
determining the permissibility of governmental accommodations of religion
under the establishment clause. Insofar as this approach builds on the
concerns at the core of nonestablishment doctrine and recognizes the role
73. "By definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exer-
cise of religion." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. See id. at 82-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); supra text accompanying notes
60-63.
75. See Johnson, supra note 27, at 827.
76. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Estab-
lishment Clause analysis must comport with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government
make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.").
77. See, e.g., id. at 108-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 27, at 827-29 (Lemon prongs do not determine where lines
should be drawn); Schwartz, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.: The Burger Court and the Establishment
Problem, 21 Hous. L. REv. 179, 193 (1984) (Lemon test "inherently subjective"); Note, Lynch v.
Donnelly: Has the Lemon Test Soured?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 133, 142-64 (1985) (reviewing incon-
sistent lower court and Supreme Court applications of Lemon test to cr&che challenged in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
79. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (secular purpose prong
"mercurial in application"); Schwartz, supra note 78, at 193 & n.89 ( "Absolute certainty in constitu-
tional interpretation is neither possible nor particularly desirable. When, however, the Court uses a
test that requires it to divine legislative motives, to discern a program's 'primary' effect, and to calcu-
late whether that program would create 'excessive' entanglement, its decisions inevitably result in
absolute uncertainty regarding the meaning of the Constitution.").
80. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 19, at 3 (juxtaposing Supreme Court's continued rigid reli-
ance on Lemon with attempts to articulate new approaches grounded in religious liberty).
81. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of accommodations in furthering free exercise, it provides a standard capa-
ble of consistent application and avoids the criticism levelled against the
Lemon test. Under this Note's approach, a governmental accommodation
of religion does not violate the establishment clause, if (1) its purpose is to
remove a government imposed burden on religious exercise; (2) in effect, it
neither endorses religion, provides financial support to religious exercise,
nor imposes the affirmance of religious beliefs; and (3) it does not exces-
sively entangle government with religion. 2
1. Assessing the Purpose of an Accommodation
As argued above, invalidating an accommodation of religion because its
purpose is manifestly non-secular overlooks the accommodation's impor-
tance in furthering free exercise. Rather than attempting to ascribe a secu-
lar purpose to the legislation at issue,8" the inquiry under the purpose
prong should focus on whether the legislation is designed to remove gov-
ernmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise. Identification of a reli-
gious belief or practice that, absent the accommodative legislation at issue,
is at risk of being indirectly burdened by other governmental action should
normally be sufficient to legitimate the purpose of the challenged legisla-
tion. Should the history of the legislation indicate that, despite its pur-
ported purpose, its central function is to endorse religion, the legislation
should be struck down.
84
In Wallace v. Jaffree,85 for example, Justice O'Connor considered
whether the statute at issue, which provided for a moment of silence in
school to be used for meditation or prayer, could be characterized as an
accommodation rather than as an endorsement of religion.8" Observing
that there was no religious practice at risk of being burdened through
government action because Alabama law already called for a moment of
silence,87 she concluded that the statute's purpose was to endorse religion
82. The three components proposed in this Note do not necessarily exhaust all impermissible
governmental involvements with religion. For example, an additional nonestablishment principle not
easily subsumed under those discussed is the requirement that government not use religious means to
realize governmental ends. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 280-81 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring). This Note focuses on these three factors because they represent central
principles of nonestablishment jurisprudence that are likely to function in the accommodation context.
83. The attempt to devise a secular purpose for an accommodation of religion may obscure its role
in removing governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise, and, consequently, may confuse
the inquiry concerning its permissibility under the establishment clause. This inquiry should focus
directly on the accommodation's success in removing such burdens. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at
83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose" of
an accommodation; religious purpose is "legitimated by the Free Exercise Clause").
84. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 60 (opinion of the Court).
85. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
86. Id. at 83-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. Id.
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impermissibly."8 She emphasized, however, that the Court's holding did
not necessarily apply to the moment of silence statutes of other states."9
The permissible purpose requirement would be satisfied with respect to
such statutes upon a showing that, absent statutory protection, some reli-
gious belief or practice would be burdened by governmental action.
2. Assessing the Primary Effect of an Accommodation
The voluntary nature of religious exercise is imperiled when govern-
ment confers its official imprimatur on religion,90 when tax revenues are
used to support religious activities,91 or when government requires the af-
firmance or disaffirmance of religious beliefs. 2 The neutral primary effect
requirement provides that an accommodation may not mandate the profes-
sion of religious beliefs, endorse religion, or provide direct financial sup-
port to religion. It ensures that the effects of an accommodation not ex-
tend beyond the purpose of removing governmentally imposed burdens.
88. Id. at 84.
89. Justice O'Connor stated: "The Court holds only that Alabama has intentionally crossed the
line between creating a quiet moment during which those so inclined may pray, and affirmatively
endorsing the particular religious practice of prayer." Id. The Court this term granted certiorari to
consider the constitutionality of a New Jersey moment of silence statute. Karcher v. May, 55
U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1987), granting cert. from May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.
1985).
90. Justice O'Connor identifies governmental endorsement of religion and entanglement with reli-
gion as the two dangers against which the establishment clause is intended to guard. Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Endorsement of religion infringes on
the religious liberty of nonadherents by making religious adherence "relevant to a -person's standing in
the political community." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). It conveys a message to nonadherents that they are "outsiders." Conversely, it confers a pre-
ferred status on adherents. Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 688). The Court relied on the
endorsement principle in Wallace v. Jaffree to strike down an Alabama statute sanctioning a moment
of silence in schools. 472 U.S. at 60.
91. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
93. The neutral primary effect requirement has received the Court's most sustained attention in
the cases concerning aid to sectarian schools. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Although the Court never explicitly embraced the position in the "aid to parochial school" cases
that the issue of primary effect involved endorsement and financial support, the factors that it consid-
ered salient to its inquiry under the primary effect prong reveal these related concerns. Among the
considerations relevant to the Court's evaluation of whether government aid had the primary effect of
advancing religion were the form of aid, compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977)
(upholding provision of diagnostic services) and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (up-
holding state book grants) with Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472
(1973) (striking down direct governmental reimbursement to schools), and the recipient of the aid,
compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding tax deduction to parents for tuition ex-
penses) with Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking
down governmental reimbursement to schools).
Aid that clearly extended the benefits of public welfare to private individuals and was tailored to
facilitate their choices was less suspect than direct financial aid to religious schools, which had the
appearance of endorsing the religious mission of the schools by putting governmental funds collected
from individual taxpayers at the schools' disposal. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
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a. Endorsement
Determining whether an accommodation impermissibly endorses reli-
gion requires "judicial interpretation of social facts." '94 Thus, it involves
an informed assessment of the historical context giving rise to the accom-
modation.9 5 Legislation written in religiously neutral terms96 and tailored
to enhance the choices of private individuals avoids the appearance of en-
dorsement. 97 An accommodation should convey the message that it is
treating religious adherents differently only in order to remove govern-
mentally imposed burdens.
b. Financial Aid
Financial support usually signifies endorsement. Nevertheless, even if it
were possible for government to provide financial aid without endorsing
religion, such support might still violate the establishment clause. Irre-
(upholding tax deductions for tuition expenses) with Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking down state reimbursements to schools for expenses incurred in
administering state-required exams).
94. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. "The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement .... " Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor's focus on the perspective of the "objective observer" is problematic given her
characterization of endorsement. In her view, endorsement creates disparities between the experiences
of religious adherents and nonadherents. Consequently, a neutral ground for evaluation may be im-
possible. A solution is to judge governmental endorsement of religion by adopting the perspective of
the reasonable nonadherent. See, e.g., Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 781-82
(10th Cir. 1985) (considering rabbi's and other non-Christians' impressions of cross depicted on
county seal to infer that seal impermissibly endorsed religion), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986).
Justice O'Connor's failure to engage in such an exercise may have contributed to her inability to
perceive the endorsement of Christianity that others would see as inherent in the creche at issue in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding state-funded creche under
establishment clause); see id. at 701-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The effect on minority religious
groups, as well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that their views are
not [as] worthy of public recognition [as the views of those believing in the message of the nativity] nor
entitled to public support.").
96. See Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (statute confer-
ring on employees right not to work on their sabbath impermissibly endorses sabbath observance); id.
at 711-12 (objective observer would perceive Title VII's reasonable accommodation requirement as
antidiscrimination law rather than as endorsement of religion or of particular religious practices, in
part because requirement extends to all beliefs and practices).
However, legislation referring to a specific religion does not necessarily endorse that religion imper-
missibly. The historical context and the implementation of the legislation may militate against the
appearance of endorsement. See, e.g., The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1902(b)
(1982) (exempting slaughter "in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any
other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers [instantaneous]
loss of consciousness").
97. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 399 ("[w]here, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only
as a result of decisions of individual parents, no 'imprimatur of state approval' . . . can be deemed to
have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally." (citation omitted)).
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spective of whether government is placing its imprimatur on religion, gov-
ernment may not finance religious exercise.98
In determining the validity of financial support,9" the Court has drawn
a line between programs that subsidize religious operations and programs
that, by funding the secular activities of a religious institution, effectively
permit the institution to devote greater resources to its religious activi-
ties.100 Government's legitimate interest in the secular activities of reli-
giously affiliated institutions is sufficient to justify government funding of
those activities as long as the funded secular activities are separate from
the institutions' religious activities 01 and the program does not impermis-
sibly endorse religion 02 nor impose religious beliefs.1 03 Consequently, ac-
commodations of religion may not involve government subsidies to reli-
gious institutions unless such subsidies are in furtherance of legitimate
governmental interests other than the interest in accommodation.1 '
98. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Regardless of
whether taking an individual's money to fund religious practice impermissibly influences such an
individual to conform, it constitutes a direct injury to conscience. Id.; see also Gilfillan v. City of
Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 931 (3d Cir. 1980) ("regardless of imprimatur," Philadelphia's construc-
tion of stage for Pope's visit had "unique" religious effect in that it "effectively enabled the Pope to
reach large numbers of persons and to perform a religious service"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981); Schwartz, supra note 78, at 194-205 (proposing separate establishment tests for doctrinal and
financial support).
99. The question of financial subsidy is distinct from the question of tax exemptions for religious
institutions, even though the latter "necessarily operate to afford an indirect benefit." Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for churches). "'[[I]]n the
case of direct subsidy, the state forcibly diverts the income of both believers and nonbelievers to
churches,' while '[in the case of an exemption, the state merely refrains from diverting to its own uses
income independently generated by the churches through voluntary contributions.' " Id. at 691 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (quoting Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment Part I: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 553 (1968)). In his majority
opinion, Chief Justice Burger traces the lineage of the numerous existing tax exemptions to the tradi-
tional prohibition of financial involvement between government and churches. "The hazards of
churches supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of government
supporting churches." WValz, 397 U.S. at 675. See generally Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Consti-
tution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969) (criticizing assumptions underlying argument that tax exemptions
for churches are establishment of religion).
100. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973). The proposition that all financial aid to
religion is impermissible, premised as it is on a conception of the fungibility of resources, has been
consistently rejected by the Court. See id.; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971). Tilton
involved federal construction grants to church-affiliated colleges and universities for facilities devoted
to secular functions. Invalidating the program on the ground that it freed institutional resources for
the construction of buildings dedicated to religious worship would have required the assumption that
the institutions involved would not have undertaken the construction of religious buildings without the
financial aid to the secular construction program. This assumption, however, is questionable: Without
the funding, the institutions' priorities might have led them, on the contrary, to build buildings de-
voted to religious activities while forsaking other secular construction.
101. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973)
(funding for governmentally mandated testing impermissible because aid "devoted to secular functions
. . . not identifiable and separable from aid to sectarian activities").
102. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
104. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (uphold-
ing reimbursement to sectarian schools for administration of state-mandated tests). Thus legislation
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c. Imposed Affirmance of Religious Belief
Although the Court has not applied it in recent cases arising under the
establisment clause, a fundamental nonestablishment principle is that gov-
ernment may not "force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion.'",5 In Torcaso v. Watkins, for example, the Court held that
Maryland's constitutional provision conditioning public office on the pro-
fession of belief in God violated the appellant's freedom of belief and reli-
gion.10 8 The state's exercise of force to compel affirmance of religious be-
liefs is a paradigmatic establishment of religion. Such compulsion has the
obvious primary effect of advancing religion.1""
3. Assessing Potential for Entanglement
The third component of the Lemon standard requires that government
not become excessively entangled with religion. Application of this re-
quirement to accommodations of religion presents no special problems.
Exemptions do not risk excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.10 8 If accommodations involve affirmative government actions, gov-
ernment may not supervise religious institutions 09 or decide questions of
religious practice or doctrine, which are beyond its competence.Y1 Con-
versely, accommodations may not delegate to religion control over affairs
properly within the sphere of government."1
that, by subsidizing travel to church, sought to offset the effects of zoning ordinances that required
adherents to live a distance from their churches would be impermissible, even if it were possible to
draft such legislation to avoid the appearance of endorsement.
105. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (quoting Everson v. Illinois, 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947)); see also West Va. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute
in school infringes on freedom of belief).
106. 367 U.S. at 496.
107. Because this requirement implicates individual freedom of belief, it can be characterized as
deriving from the free exercise guarantee. In fact, the Court has invoked it regularly as a free exercise
principle. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). Nevertheless, insofar as the prohi-
bition against governmental imposition of religious beliefs extends even to forcing a person to affirm
religious beliefs with which he or she agrees, it captures a core nonestablishment principle.
108. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (tax exemption "creates only a
minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches").
The potential for governmental entanglement in the enforcement of a statutory exemption is no
greater than the entanglement that attends courts' disposition of free exercise claims for exemptions.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1972) (describing deep religious convictions of
Amish); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968) (doubting sincerity of
religious commitment of church whose official songs are "Puff, the Magic Dragon" and "Row, Row,
Row Your Boat"). But see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (broadly reading consci-
entious objector statute to cover objectors having a "'sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption'" (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965))).
109. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
110. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
111. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). In Grendel's Den, the Court struck
down a statute that gave churches discretion to decide whether liquor sales could occur within 500 feet
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD TO THE NEW YORK Get
STATUTE
In determining whether the New York get statute is a permissible ac-
commodation of religion, a court should ask the following questions: First,
does the statute alleviate burdens on free exercise that indirectly result
from legislation? Second, does the statute avoid endorsement of religion
and imposition of religious beliefs? Third, does the statute avoid excessive
governmental entanglement with religion?
A. The New York Get Statute as an Accommodation of Religious
Exercise
1. Marriage as a Free Exercise Right and the Burden Imposed by
Civil Divorce
The right to marry is one of the cluster of fundamental freedoms con-
cerning familial matters accorded constitutional stature by the Supreme
Court."1 2 Although courts have most frequently spoken of marriage as
protected within a zone of privacy,"' 3 the right to marry can involve a
religious dimension which ties it more closely to the Constitution's free
exercise guarantee."" The centrality of marriage within different religious
traditions is recognized by solemnization provisions in every state. Solem-
nization permits a couple to enter a legally binding relationship through a
religious ceremony, in effect, granting civil legal status to a religious
ceremony.' 15
In Judaism, marriage is central to religious life.11 Significant religious
of their property. The statute impermissibly gave a religious institution control over a governmental
function, the licensing of liquor establishments. Id. at 126-27.
112. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute conditioning freedom to marry on
showing that support obligations to minor children have been met violates due process); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (miscegenation laws interfere with fundamental right to marry pro-
tected by due process clause); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (upholding
parents' right to send children to private school).
113. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1969).
114. But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (free exercise does not require Mor-
mon exemption from statute prohibiting bigamy). Reynolds relied on a distinction, subsequently aban-
doned, between beliefs, which were protected under the free exercise clause, and actions, which were
not, id. at 164, 166-67. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972).
115. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11(1) (McKinney 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
765.16(1)-(3) (West 1981); cf Wolfe v. Wolfe, 76 Ill. 2d 92, 389 N.E.2d 1143 (1979) (annulling
marriage on basis of fraud affecting essentials of marriage). In Wolfe, the defendant deceived the
plaintiff, a devout Catholic, into marrying her by telling him that her first husband had passed away.
The court held that this fraud affected the essentials of the marriage and made the defendant unable
to continue to perform marital duties and obligations. Wolfe reflects the court's view that religious
commitment is often an essential aspect of a marriage.
116. The obligation to marry arises from the obligation to be fruitful and multiply. Genesis 1:28.
See M. MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, BOOK OF WOMEN 93-95 (I. Klein trans. 1972) (Laws
Concerning Marriage Ch. XV, §§ 1-7) 1 M. MAIMONIDES, SEFER HA-MITZVOT 228-30 (C.
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obligations that are fulfilled within the domestic sphere devolve upon the
observant Jewish woman.11 7 Because freedom to enter into a Jewish mar-
riage is important to a Jewish woman's religious observance, it falls
within the protection of the free exercise clause.
Prior to the enactment of the get statute, civil divorce indirectly bur-
dened the right to marry within Judaism of women whose husbands ob-
tained civil divorces without giving gets to their wives. Civil divorce did
not condition a legal result on their nonadherence to Judaism,118 but, like
the legislation challenged in Braunfeld, it contributed to the cost of such
adherence.119 Civil divorce impeded some women's ability to marry within
Judaism because their former husbands desired to change their civil mari-
tal status but were unwilling to procure Jewish divorces. The inability to
remarry within Judaism can thus be described as an indirect effect
120 of
civil divorce; the state's attempt to offset this effect constitutes an accom-
modation of religion.
121
2. Operation of the Statute
The get statute requires a party filing for divorce to remove all barriers
within his or her power to the other party's marriage, as such barriers are
Chavel trans. 1967) (Positive Commandment 212). For the importance of marriage in Judaism, see
M. LAMM, supra note 1, at 120.
117. Having developed within a male perspective, Jewish law does not impose a positive obliga-
tion specifically on women to marry. Nevertheless, some sages argued that the duty to procreate de-
volves on women as well as men. See THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Yebamoth 65a-65b.
Moreover, the three obligations that define Jewish observance for women, lighting of the Sabbath
candles (Shabbat), proper preparation of the bread (Hallah), and family purity (Niddah), see id.,
Tractate Shabbat 31b, presume the state of marriage. In contemporary Orthodoxy a woman's pri-
mary religious responsibility is to develop and nurture Jewish values within the domestic sphere. See
M. MEISELMAN, JEWISH WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 16-18 (1978). Marriage is central to Conserva-
tive Judaism as well. See R. GORDIS, SEX AND THE FAMILY IN THE JEWISH TRADITION 33 (1967)
("Judaism regards marriage and not celibacy as the ideal human state, because it alone offers the
opportunity for giving expression to all aspects of human nature.")
118. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
119. While Braunfeld involved economic costs imposed on religious observance, see supra notes
44-48 and accompanying text, the cost here might be characterized as social.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. The husband's refusal to grant a get is analogous
to the competitive retail business in Braunfeld. Despite the get statute, husbands may still leave their
wives without giving them gets, just as Sabbatarians might still have encountered ruinous competition
from non-Sabbatarians, even if a Sabbatarian exception to the Sunday Closing Law had been enacted.
The Sabbatarian exception would have neutralized whatever increased costs might be attributable to
the Sunday Closing Law. Similarly, the get statute neutralizes whatever contributory role civil divorce
has in the agunah problem. While this role, of course, cannot be measured, the availability of civil
divorce may increase men's propensity to withhold a get because the procurement of a civil divorce
lends a sufficient air of legitimacy to what would otherwise be desertion.
121. Some critics argue that the get statute attempts to solve a problem created by Jewish law,
which only Jewish law is equipped to resolve. See, e.g., Kochen, supra note 16, at 1. This argument
misconstrues the statute, which addresses the problem only to the extent that it may be exacerbated by
the availability of civil divorce. Husbands who abandon their wives but do not seek a change in their
civil marital status do not fall within the reach of the statute, even though their wives will not be able
to remarry under Jewish law.
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defined by the religious tradition within which the original wedding took
place.122 The statute permits the cleric who originally solemnized the
marriage to submit an affidavit to contest the filing party's contention that
he or she has removed all barriers.1
23
The statute thus effectively requires husbands married under Conserva-
tive or Orthodox Jewish law, who seek civil divorces, to procure a get.
Becausd the statute applies only when parties who were married in a reli-
gious ceremony initiate civil divorce procedures,124 it does not apply to
parties who separate without seeking a legal change in their marital sta-
tus. The statute thus removes only those burdens on women's right to
122. N.Y. Dom,. REL. LAW § 253(1)-(9) (McKinney 1986). The statute states:
1. This section applies only to a marriage solemnized in this state or in any other
jurisdiction ...
2. Any party to a marriage defined in subdivision one of this section who commences a pro-
ceeding to annul the marriage or for a divorce must allege, in his or her verified complaint: (i)
that, to the best of his or her knowledge, that he or she has taken or that he or she will take,
prior to the entry of final judgment, all steps solely within his or her power to remove any
barrier to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the de-
fendant has waived in writing the requirements of this subdivision.
3. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall thereafter be entered unless the plaintiff
shall have filed and served a sworn statement [that, as specified in subsection two, all steps
have been taken to remove all barriers to defendant's remarriage or the defendant has waived
the requirements of this section].
6. As used in the sworn statements prescribed by this section "barrier to remarriage" includes,
without limitation, any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition, of which the party
required to make the verified statement is aware, that is imposed on a party to a marriage,
under the principles held by the clergyman or minister who has solemnized the marriage, by
reason of the other party's commission or withholding of any voluntary act. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require any party to consult with any clergyman or minister to
determine whether there exists any such religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition. It
shall not be deemed a "barrier to remarriage" within the meaning of this section if the re-
straint or inhibition cannot be removed by the party's voluntary act. Nor shall it be deemed a
"barrier to remarriage" if the party must incur expenses in connection with removal of the
restraint or inhibition and the other party refuses to provide reasonable reimbursement for
such expenses. "All steps solely within his or her power" shall not be construed to include
application to a marriage tribunal or other similar organization or agency of a religious de-
nomination which has authority to annul or dissolve a marriage under the rules of such
denomination.
7. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall be entered, notwithstanding the filing of
the plaintiff's sworn statement prescribed by this section, if the clergyman or minister who has
solemnized the marriage certifies, in a sworn statement, that he or she has solemnized the
marriage and that, to his or her knowledge, the plaintiff has failed to take all steps solely
within his or her power to remove all barriers to the defendant's remarriage following the
annulment or divorce, provided that the said clergyman or minister is alive and available and
competent to testify at the time when final judgment would be entered.
8. Any person who knowingly submits a false sworn statement under this section shall be
guilty of making an apparently sworn false statement in the first degree . ...
9. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any court to inquire into or deter-
mine any ecclesiastical or religious issue. The truth of any statement submitted pursuant to
this section shall not be the subject of any judicial inquiry, except as provided in subdivision
eight of this section.
123. Id. § 253(7).
124. Id. § 253(1)-(2).
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marry within Judaism to which the availability of civil divorce
contributes.
B. Endorsement
Although the get statute benefits observant Jewish women at risk of
being civilly divorced without receiving a get, it does not suggest imper-
missible endorsement of religion or of the Jewish religion. The statute is
written in religiously neutral terms and extends to "conscientious re-
straints or inhibitions."12 5 It thus anticipates any situation where a party
to a divorce may impede the remarriage of the other party.' 26 The scope
of the statute, though, is limited to parties originally married in a religious
ceremony.1 27 The statute does not promote a particular type of religious
marriage or divorce, or religious marriage and divorce generally, but
merely conditions civil dissolution of a marriage on satisfaction of require-
ments that were implicit at its inception.
The inquiry regarding the statute's potential for endorsement, however,
may not stop with the statute's text. A person acquainted with the stat-
ute's history"2 8 would be aware that it was passed specifically to alleviate
a problem arising in the interaction between Jewish and civil law.' 29 Con-
sequently, it is necessary to consider whether, as applied to parties mar-
ried within Judaism, the statute does not impermissibly endorse that reli-
gion. Insofar as the get statute requires a party married in a Jewish
ceremony to appear before a rabbinic tribunal in order to receive a civil
divorce, the statute might appear to endorse the Jewish religion. However,
certain aspects of Jewish law militate against this view.
In Judaism, the legal dimensions of marriage are essentially contrac-
tual. 30 Marriage terminates either upon the death of one party or upon
the presentation of a get."' By appearing before a rabbinic tribunal the
husband is fulfilling an obligation he incurred upon entering a Jewish
marriage.' 82 In requiring the "removal of barriers to remarriage" as de-
125. Id. § 253(6).
126. The statute, however, does not require parties married within Catholicism to seek an annul-
ment in order to procure a civil divorce. See id. § 253(6).
127. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(1)-(2) (McKinney 1986).
128. Familiarity with the statute's historical context is important in assessing the statute's poten-
tial for endorsement. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
129. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253 practice commentary at 851-52 (McKinney 1986).
130. I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 382.
131. 1. HAuT, supra note 1, at 17. Marriage has both a religious and a legal aspect. The latter
concerns the obligations that the partners in a marriage have assumed towards each other, which are
enforceable in court. I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 382.
132. In Orthodox Judaism, the marriage contract states that the parties are betrothed according to
the laws of Moses and Israel; by this contract the husband assumes towards his wife the obligations
prescribed by Jewish law. See M. LAMM, supra note 1, at 197-200. These include delivery of a get
upon separation of the spouses. Deuteronomy 24:1.
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fined in the religious tradition within which the marriage was enacted, the
statute enforces this obligation. Similarly, in the commercial context,
courts enforce arbitration agreements to appear before rabbinical tribunals
and abide by their decisions."' The statute effectively remedies a religious
bias that was masked in the formal neutrality of civil divorce prior to the
get statute. The assumption that marriage is a status under the control of
a court, rather than a contract between two parties, originates in a partic-
ular religious tradition." 4
C. Imposition of Religious Beliefs
Courts might be prohibited from requiring the removal of barriers to
remarriage if such removal required the affirmance of a religious belief.
The delivery of a get, however, involves neither professions of faith nor
devotional acts. 35 The text of the get makes no reference to God by name.
It merely states that the husband is releasing the wife from her marital
obligations and freeing her to remarry.13 ' Like a Jewish commercial con-
tract, the exchange of a get is exclusively regulated by the "civil" aspect of
Jewish law, which governs relationships between human beings.13 7
If the husband was married in a Conservative ceremony, the marriage contract that he signed may
in addition have provided that at the summons of one party the other party would appear in front of a
rabbinical tribunal and comply with its decision. I. HAUT, supra note 1, at 64.
In Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert denied, 464 U.S.
817 (1983), the New York Court of Appeals enforced the terms of a marriage contract requiring the
parties to appear before a rabbinical tribunal in the event of marital difficulties. The court found that
it could enforce the terms of the marriage contract by applying "neutral principles of corltract law."
58 N.Y.2d at 114-15, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39, 459 N.Y.S.2d. at 574-75. "This approach contemplates
the application of objective, well-established principles of secular law to the dispute, . . . , thus per-
mitting judicial involvement to the extent that it can be accomplished in purely secular terms." Id. at
115, 446 N.E.2d at 138, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (citation omited). The Supreme Court has upheld the
neutral principles of law approach under the establishment clause as a method of resolving church
property disputes. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); see also Minkin v. Minkin, 180 N.J.
Super. 260, 434 A.2d 665 (Ch. Div. 1981) (requiring husband to obtain a get pursuant to marriage
contract under which parties agreed to conform to laws of Moses and Israel).
133. See, e.g., Kingsbridge Center of Israel v. Turk, 98 A.D.2d 664, 469 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1983)
(upholding rabbinical court resolution of dispute arising under employment contract stipulating that
disputes would be decided by rabbinical court); see also Gelbfish v. Grossman, 46 A.D.2d 863, 361
N.Y.S.2d 673 (1974) (staying action arising from property dispute pending arbitration by rabbinical
tribunal).
134. See H. CLARK, JR., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMES-IC RELATIONS 7 (1980). Although
the American colonies did not inherit English ecclesiastical courts, they received the English ecclesias-
tical rules regarding marriage. Id. These rules were administered by civil courts. See, e.g., G. HAs-
KINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHuSETS 63, 195 (1960). Under these rules a divorce
was effected through a petition to a court. See 2 G. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS 366-67 (1904). For a discussion of the earlier progression from marriage and divorce at the
husband's will to marriage and divorce under ecclesiastical courts, see generally 1 & 2 G. HOWARD,
supra.
135. See I. HAUT, supra note 1, at 31-41 (describing get procedure).
136. Id. at 17-18.
137. See I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 382. In Minkin, the court held that enforcement of a marriage
contract requiring the procurement of a get did not violate the establishment clause because exchange
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D. Nonentanglement
The get statute's operation risks governmental entanglement with reli-
gion in two ways. First, the statute appears to require judges to decide the
doctrinal question of whether the barriers to the remarriage of a party to
divorce have been properly removed under Jewish law.138 Second, by al-
lowing the cleric who solemnized the original marriage to contest by affi-
davit a party's claim that barriers to the other party's remarriage have
been removed, the statute appears to give a religious functionary discre-
tion over a governmental function, the granting of a divorce.' 39 The stat-
ute, however, can be read narrowly to avoid these apparent
entanglements.
Whether a get has been exchanged is not a complex doctrinal question;
it is a factual matter, readily ascertainable within the Orthodox or Con-
servative tradition. A certificate signed by the rabbis who supervised the
get demonstrates compliance with the technical requirements for the pres-
entation of a get.'40 The only doctrinal question that may arise is whether
a get exchanged in the Conservative tradition is sufficient to constitute a
valid get in the Orthodox tradition. To avoid resolving this problem,
courts should interpret the statute narrowly, according to its terms, which
require the removal of barriers to remarriage as such barriers are defined
by the tradition within which the original marriage took place.14 To de-
cide this issue, the get statute requires that the court defer to the authority
who is most competent to determine this fact: the cleric who solemnized
the wedding. 42
In property disputes between church factions, courts are permitted
under the establishment clause to defer to the highest authority within a
hierarchical church on the issue of which faction legitimately represents
the church. 43 In limiting the entry of an affidavit specifically to the cleric
who originally solemnized the marriage, the statute functions like the rule
providing for courts' deference to a religious authority in a property dis-
pute. To avoid excessive entanglement with religion, courts may not per-
mit anyone but the cleric who officiated at the original wedding to enter
an affidavit regarding the removal of barriers to remarriage.
14 4
of a get was "devoid of any religious connotation." Minkin v. Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. 260, 266, 434
A.2d 665, 668 (Ch. Div. 1981).
138. N.Y. DOM. Rt.. LAW § 253(3), (6) (McKinney 1986).
139. Id. § 253(7).
140. See G. HOROWITz, supra note 5, at 281. For an example of a Conservative certificate of
divorce, see I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 490.
141. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(6) (McKinney 1986).
142. Under the statute an affidavit by the cleric who solemnized the original marriage takes prior-
ity over any affidavits entered by the parties. Id. § 253(5).
143. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-725 (1976).
144. The statute specifically avoids providing for an alternative if the original cleric has passed
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The get statute removes governmentally imposed burdens on religious
exercise and, consequently, promotes free exercise norms. Because it
neither endorses nor requires the affirmance of religious beliefs, and it can
be interpreted narrowly to avoid excessive government entanglement with
religion, it should be upheld as a permissible accommodation of religion.
E. Potential Free Exercise Challenges
A husband originally married under Jewish law but subsequently con-
verted to a different religion may claim that complying with the get stat-
ute violates his free exercise of religion. If the dictates of his religion con-
flict with the giving of a get then the statute directly burdens his religious
exercise. In such circumstances his claim should be treated no differently
from any other claim for an exemption under the free exercise clause. 145
V. CONCLUSION
A systematic resolution of the constitutional questions raised by the get
statute will require the courts to apply the nonestablishment mandate to
accommodations of religion. This Note proposes a standard to determine
the permissibility of accommodations of religion to assist courts confronted
with the constitutionality of legislation intended to remove burdens on re-
ligious exercise created by government action. Application of the standard
to the get statute suggests its validity under the establishment clause.
The usefulness of the proposed approach extends beyond its application
to the get statute. An analysis that focuses first on whether legislation
removes governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise should
provide the basis for a unified approach to a broad range of establishment
problems that might otherwise appear so diverse as to preclude common
analysis. At base, the approach reflects the concern for religious liberty
that is the core of the religion clauses.
away. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(7). This limitation may make the statute underinclusive; but it is
preferable to encouraging courts to become entangled impermissibly with religion.
145. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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